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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. CONTINUOUS TREATMENT EXCEPTION REJECTED
In Dillon County School District No. Two v. Lewis Sheet
Metal Works, Inc.1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals re-
jected the continuous treatment exception to the general rule
governing the accrual of a cause of action.2 The case involved a
suit by appellant Dillon County School District Number Two
(School District) for the recovery of losses resulting from the de-
fective design and construction of a roof to a school building.
The court held that the six-year statute of limitations3 began to
run "when the School District either discovered or could have
discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence that the roof
to its building was defective."'4 This decision should warn practi-
tioners not to delay filing suit beyond the applicable statute of
1. 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 287 S.C. 234, 337 S.E.2d
697 (1985), cert. dismissed, 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986).
2. As a general rule, "the statute of limitations commences upon the occurrence of
the essential facts constituting the cause of action, regardless of whether these facts are
discovered by the client." Moorehead v. Miller, 102 F.R.D. 834, 837 (D.V.I. 1984)(some-
times referred to as the occurrence rule). The continuous treatment exception acts to toll
or defer accrual by holding that "when a course of treatment by a professional which
includes wrongful acts and omissions has been continuous and is related to the original
condition or complaint, the claim accures at the end of the treatment." County of
Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 890, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1001
(1974)(citing Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d
319 (1962)).
3. A six-year accrual period is prescribed by S.C. CODE ANN §§ 15-3-510, -530(5)
(1976 & Supp. 1985).
4. 286 S.C. at 214, 332 S.E.2d at 559. The discovery rule, applied here by the court,
has emerged as "the predominant doctrine of accrual despite 140 years of precedent with
the occurrence rule." Moorehead, 102 F.R.D. at 837. The discovery rule was applied first
in South Carolina by the federal district court in Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33
(D.S.C. 1976). The following year, the South Carolina Legislature codified the rule by
providing that "[e]xcept as to actions initiated under § 15-3-545 of the 1976 Code, all
actions initiated under Item 5 of § 15-3-530 as amended, shall be commenced with six
years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known
that he had a cause of action." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (Supp. 1985). In Brown v.
Sandwood Dev. Corp., 277 S.C. 581, 291 S.E.2d 375 (1982), the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that construction and design defects were within the scope of the rule. See
Snell v. Columbia Gun Exch., 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981); Mills v. Killian, 273
S.C. 66, 254 S.E.2d 556 (1979)(rule extended to cases involving legal malpractice).
1
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limitations period merely because of an opposing party's contin-
uous treatment of a defect or injury since these efforts alone will
not toll the statute in South Carolina.5
In 1970, Dargan Construction Company, serving as general
contractor, began construction on a building to house Dillon
County High School." Although the roof was completed in 1970,
several leaks had already been reported before the building was
completed in January 1971. Over the next nine years, the leaks
remained a persistent problem despite the continuous efforts of
Dargan; G.M.K., Incorporated, the architect; and Lewis Sheet
Metal Works, Dargan's subcontractor, to repair the roof.
7
The School District filed suit on June 29, 1981, and each
respondent asserted the statute of limitations as a defense. The
circuit court granted the respondents' motions for summary
judgment. The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's
conclusion that the six-year statute of limitations began to run
in November 19728 and affirmed the grant of summary judgment
to respondents Bonitz, King, Celotex, and Grace.9
5. If, however, a party's efforts to repair a defect are coupled with assurances to an
injured party that the defects can be corrected, the former may be equitably estopped
from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense in South Carolina. 286 S.C. at 218,
332 S.E.2d at 561 (citing City of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216, 218 (4th
Cir. 1977)); see A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. Funk Bldg. Corp., 278 Pa. Super. 385, 420 A.2d
594 (1980); School Bd. v. GAF Corp., 413 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. App. 1982). See generally 51
AM. Jue. 2D Limitations of Actions § 431 (1970); 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 25
(1948).
6. The six other respondents included Lewis Sheet Metal Works, who was responsi-
ble for installing the roofing membrane, metal flashing, and roof balance; G.M.K., Incor-
porated, the project's architect; Bonitz Insulation Company, who installed the metal roof
work and the roof's concrete deck and accoustical ceiling; King, the prqject's engineer;
W.R. Grace & Company, who provided the roof's decking material; and Celotex Corpora-
tion, the manufacturer of roofing materials. 286 S.C. at 210, 332 S.E.2d at 556.
7. Id. at 211, 332 S.E.2d at 556-57. From the latter part of 1970 until early 1981,
numerous meetings were held and extensive correspondence ensued between G.M.K.,
Dargan, Lewis, and School District representatives on how to deal with the leaking roof.
Despite repeated efforts by Dargan and Lewis to repair the roof, more leaks continued to
develop. Id.
. 8. 286 S.C. at 216-17, 332 S.E.2d at 560. "Like the circuit court, we are satisfied that
by November, 1972, when the architect for the project referred to the roofing problem as
a 'continual problem' and suggested possibly involving the county attorney, the School
District either knew or reasonably should have known its problem with the roof was a
serious one." Id. at 216, 332 S.E.2d at 560.
9. 286 S.C. at 217, 332 S.E.2d at 560. The court of appeals reversed and remanded
with respect to G.M.K., Dargan, and Lewis, holding that a jury question exists regarding
whether these three respondents should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute
of limitations for having "invited the very delay they now assert as a defense. . . ... Id.
2
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The court gave two reasons for rejecting the continuous
treatment exception. First, the court noted that the discovery
rule is applicable by statute in South Carolina and that no juris-
diction has yet applied the continuous treatment exception
where the discovery rule is in effect.10 The court agreed with
Judge Hemphill's statement in Gattis v. Chavez 1 that the con-
tinuous treatment exception is "on the whole. . . simply an ab-
errant form of the traditional rule which some courts seem to
have adopted either to do justice in a specific case or to present
the appearance of having effected a compromise between two
antithetical rules."' 2 Second, the court reasoned that an unac-
ceptable consequence of the continuous treatment doctrine is
that "a cause of action for breach of warranty or negligent per-
formance... would never accrue so long as the defendants pe-
riodically did some repair work, however ineffectual.' 13
An important point never clearly addressed by the court in
this decision is that the continuous treatment exception previ-
ously had been applied almost exclusively to claims for profes-
sional malpractice. 4 While the doctrine has usually been applied
in suits brought against physicians, a growing number of courts
have applied the doctrine in malpractice actions involving other
professionals,' 5 including one action against an architect.' 6 The
at 219, 332 S.E.2d at 562; see supra notes 5 and 6.
10. 286 S.C. at 217, 332 S.E.2d at 560; see supra note 4.
11. 413 F. Supp. 33 (D.S.C. 1976).
12. Id. at 39.
13. 286 S.C. at 217, 332 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting with approval Cluett, Peabody & Co.
v. Campbell, Rea, Hayes & Large, 492 F. Supp. 67, 77 (M.D. Pa. 1980)). Contra Davis v.
City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 257, 342 N.E.2d 516, 379 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1975)(if services
performed are merely intermittent, this doctrine will not apply).
14. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979). "The
concept is ... a narrow one proceeding from the sensible propositions that a lay patient
is entitled to rely upon the professional skill of his physician, and need not be expected
to interrupt a continuing course of treatment by bringing suit." Id. at 744. The doctrine
has been applied outside the area of professional malpractice in only a few decisions.
Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)(extended doctrine
to cover manufacturers of medical devices); Colpan Realty Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
83 Misc. 2d 730, 373 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1975)(action by insured against insurer for latter's
repeated refusal to defend). "Colpan and Holdridge hold, on the particular facts
presented, that sufficiently close analogies to the attorney-client and physician-patient
relationship existed to justify application of the concept." Triangle Underwriters, 604
F.2d at 745 n.15.
15. Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); see,
e.g., Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74 Misc. 2d 1025, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1973)(ac-
3
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court of appeals, therefore, joined the vast majority of other
courts in refusing to apply the doctrine to -nonprofessionals and
departed from a growing trend in refusing to apply the doctrine
to the architect, G.M.K.
The import of this decision for South Carolina practitioners
is the court's explicit rejection of the continuous treatment doc-
trine, even as applied to professionals. A significant result of the
decision is that in South Carolina a party may be required to
interrupt the corrective efforts of another party by serving a
summons on the latter when the accrual of a cause of action ap-
proaches. Whether this result is truly commensurate with the
policies underlying statutes of limitations is questionable.
I7
Whether the adoption and broad reading of the continuous
treatment exception, urged by the School District, offers a satis-
factory answer to this dilemma is also speculative. If the doc-
trine is accepted, expanded, and refined in other jurisdictions in
the future, however, it may prove to be more than "simply an
aberrant form of the traditional rule" of accrual, 8 and its merits
might be reexamined by the courts of this state.
J. Mark Jones
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS TOLLED AGAINST OUT-OF-STATE
DEFENDANTS REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF OTHER METHODS
OF SERVICE
In two recent opinions, the South Carolina Supreme Court
countants); Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968)(attorneys). See gen-
erally Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run upon Action Against
Attorney for Malpractice, 32 A.L.R.4TH 260 (1984); Annotation, Application of Statute
of Limitations to Damage Actions Against Public Accountants for Negligence in Per-
formance of Professional Services, 26 A.L.R.3D 1438 (1969).
16. County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998
(1974). Contra Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 83 Misc. 2d 552, 370 N.Y.S.2d 338
(1975). See generally Annotation, When Statute of Limitation Begins to Run on Negli-
gent Design Claim Against Architect, 90 A.L.R.3D 507 (1979).
17. Some frequently cited policy considerations underlying statutes of limitations
are the following: "they stimulate activity, punish negligence, and promote repose by
giving security and stability to human affairs." 51 A. Jun. 2D Limitation of Actions § 18
(1970). The argument could be made that the result in this case stimulates litigation by
punishing patience.
18. 286 S.C. at 217, 332 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33, 39
(D.S.C. 1976)).
158 [Vol. 38
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addressed the question of whether statutes of limitation are
tolled against an out-of-state defendant, even when the defend-
ant is amenable to suit within the state.19 In Cutino v. Ramsey
20
the court ruled that the time limitation for bringing a tort action
was tolled even though the out-of-state defendant had been sub-
ject to service through the Chief Highway Commissioner." In
Harris v. Dunlap22 the court held that the availability of long-
arm jurisdiction in a contract action did not prevent the tolling
of the statute of limitation while the defendant was out of
state.23 These decisions place South Carolina in the minority of
jurisdictions to rule on the question."
The Cutino action arose from an automobile accident in
South Carolina. Both parties were citizens at the time of the
19. South Carolina Code § 15-3-30 provides for the tolling of statutes of limitation
when potential defendants are out of state:
If when a cause of action shall accrue against any person he shall be out of the
State, such action may be commenced within the terms in this chapter respec-
tively limited after the return of such person into this State. And if, after such
cause of action shall have accrued, such person shall depart from and reside
out of this State or remain continuously absent therefrom for the space of one
year or more, the time of his absence shall not be deemed or taken as any part
of the time limited for the commencement of such action.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-30 (1976). The tolling statute applies not only to residents who
leave the state, but also to persons who have never been residents. Macri v. Flaherty, 115
F. Supp. 739 (D.S.C. 1953). The tolling provision acts only to keep alive plaintiff's case
against an absent defendant and does not apply when the plaintiff is the party who
departs the state. Maccaw v. Crawley, 59 S.C. 342, 37 S.E. 934 (1901).
20. 285 S.C. 74, 328 S.E.2d 72 (1985). The issue was before the court on certification
from the United States District Court pursuant to S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46.
21. The statute provides a six-year limit for "[ain action upon a contract, obligation,
or liability, express or implied . . . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(1) (1976). Substituted
service on the Chief Highway Commissioner as "true and lawful attorney" for service of
process in actions arising from automobile accidents is provided for by S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-9-350 (1976).
22. 285 S.C. 226, 328 S.E.2d 908 (1985).
23. Id. at 228, 328 S.E.2d at 909. Long-arm jurisdiction is provided for by South
Carolina Code § 36-2-803:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by
an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's (a) transacting any
business in this State; (b) contracting to supply services or things in the State;
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this State; ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (1976).
24. For a classification of jurisdictions, see Annotation, Tolling of Statute of Limi-
tations During Absence from State as Affected by Fact that Party Claiming Benefit of
Limitations Remained Subject to Service During Absence or Nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3D
1158 (1974 & Supp. 1985) and 51 Am. Jup, 2D Limitation of Actions § 162 n.1 (1970 &
Supp. 1985).
5
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mishap, but the defendant permanently moved his residence to
another state six months later. Plaintiffs filed their action in fed-
eral court within the six-year period specified by section 15-3-
530,25 but were unable to secure personal service of the defend-
ant in his out-of-state residence. After the period of limitation
expired, the plaintiffs served the defendant through the Chief
Highway Commissioner. The defendant answered that the stat-
ute of limitation barred the action because personal jurisdiction
had not been obtained within the statutory period. The plain-
tiffs argued that the limitation period had tolled from the time
of the defendant's departure from South Carolina. On certifica-
tion of the tolling question, the supreme court held that statu-
tory provisions for substituted service contain no express excep-
tion to the tolling statute.2 In the absence of such language, the
tolling provisions must be interpreted as applicable despite the
availability of substituted service on the out-of-state de-
fendant
In Harris the plaintiff's contract cause of action was almost
nine years old when suit was brought in circuit court. The de-
fendant had resided in another state for sixteen years. The trial
court found that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts
with South Carolina to justify jurisdiction and rejected his stat-
ute of limitation plea. The trial court held the statute tolled dur-
ing the defendant's absence from South Carolina. 8 On appeal
the supreme court affirmed, stating that "amenability to per-
sonal service under the long-arm statute does not render the
tolling statute inapplicable. '2 The court then rejected the de-
fendant's contention that application of the tolling statute de-
nied him equal protection of the statutory limitation period. The
court found that the added difficulty of locating and personally
serving foreign defendants before the period of limitation ex-
pired constituted a rational basis for distinguishing between in-
25. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-3-530 (1976). Federal courts generally apply state limitation
and tolling statutes even when a federal cause of action is the subject of suit. See, e.g.,
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980).
26. 285 S.C. at 77, 328 S.E.2d at 73.
27. Id.
28. 285 S.C. at 227, 328 S.E.2d at 908.
29. Id. at 228, 328 S.E.2d at 909. The court based its decision upon the same lack of
specific statutory exceptions to the tolling provisions that it found significant in the Cu-
tino case.
[Vol. 38
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state and out-of-state defendants.3 0 In-state defendants are sub-
ject to service by publication when they cannot be located, but
out-of-state defendants are not."1
Cutino and Harris demonstrate that out-of-state defendants
who are amenable to suit under long-arm and related statutes
will not be able to enjoy the repose of actions available to in-
state defendants under the statutes of limitation.2 Most juris-
dictions have held that tolling statutes do not apply when the
30. Id. Those jurisdictions that continue to give effect to tolling statutes despite
modern substituted service and long-arm provisions generally have rejected the equal
protection argument. See Vostack v. Axt, 510 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Ohio 1981)(applying
Ohio law). The Axt court found that a "rational basis" standard was the appropriate test
to apply in judging the constitutionality of differing effects of statutes of limitations on
resident and nonresident defendants. Id. at 222; see also Vaughn v. Dietz, 430 S.W.2d
487 (Tex. 1968). But see Wright v. Keiser, 568 P.2d 1262 (Okla. 1977), where the court in
a 5-4 decision struck down the Oklahoma tolling statute as having no rational basis given
modern extensions of personal jurisdiction. Wright, however, rested upon interpretation
of the Oklahoma Constitution, rather than the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. While the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the equal
protection argument, it has implicitly accepted the differential treatment of out-of-state
defendants under tolling statutes. See Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647 (1893). The
Court has approved a Wisconsin tolling statute that operated when the defendant was
out of state and the plaintiff was in Wisconsin, but not when the plaintiff was also out of
state. Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72 (1876)(applying U.S. CONST. art. II, §
4, rather than the fourteenth amendment). In the recent decision of G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982), the Court considered a New Jersey tolling statute that oper-
ated against foreign corporations that had no in-state representative for service of pro-
cess. Corporations that had an in-state representative enjoyed the benefits of the statute
of limitation. The Court rejected the equal protection argument, holding that there was a
rational basis for the distinction, since service requirements were different for the two
classes of corporations. Id. at 410.
31. 285 S.C. at 229, 328 S.E.2d at 909. Service by publication is governed by S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-9-710 (1976). Generally, out-of-state residents can be served by publica-
tion only when there is in rem jurisdiction based on property in the state or in certain
domestic proceedings.
32. The repose provided by statutory limitations on the time within which actions
can be brought is not a fundamental right of constitutional proportions. Chase Sec. Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945). The failure of the equal protection argument suggests
that the running of a limitation period will not constitute an effective defense for out-of-
state defendants. The equitable defense of laches, however, might be employed by those
defendants who can show injury, prejudice, or disadvantage arising from an unjustified
delay on the part of plaintiff in bringing the action, Grossman v. Grossman, 242 S.C. 298,
130 S.E.2d 850 (1963), or where there was a demonstrably negligent failure to act for an
unreasonable length of time, Gray v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 284 S.C. 234, 325 S.E.2d 547
(1985). Laches, like the statute of limitation, is an affirmative defense, S.C.R. Civ. P. 8(c),
and can be raised in a legal action, S.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b). See, e.g., Miller v. British Am.
Assurance Co., 238 S.C. 94, 119 S.E.2d 527 (1961). In light of the court's strict construc-
tion of the tolling statute, a more liberal readiness to find prejudice in long-delayed suits
may balance the unfavorable position of out-of-state defendants.
7
Jones et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
out-of-state defendant is subject to the state's jurisdiction.3s
Robert H. Putnam, Jr.
III. STATUTE AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PREVAILING
PLAINTIFF IN MECHANICS' LIEN ACTION' DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In Southeastern Home Building & Refurbishing, Inc. v.
Platt34 sections 29-5-1035 and 29-5-203 of the South Carolina
Code, which awarded attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff but
not to a prevailing defendant in a mechanics' lien action, were
declared unconstitutional by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The statutes were struck down as violative of the equal protec-
tion clauses of both the United States and South Carolina
Constitutions.
Southeastern Home Building & Refurbishing, Inc., the ap-
pellant, brought a mechanics' lien action against respondents
V.F. Platt, Jr., and VFQ Associates, seeking a money judgment
and attorney's fees. The dispute arose when Southeastern er-
ected a fence on the respondent's property pursuant to a con-
tract with the subtenant, Coastal Country Jamboree. V.F. Platt,
33. See, e.g., Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 96 Idaho 723, 536 P.2d 291 (1975)(overruling
prior decision and noting possibility of locating and serving out-of-state defendant with
reasonably diligent efforts); Jarchow v. Eder, 433 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1967)(tolling unneces-
sary when plaintiff has a remedy available; holding otherwise is to adopt in effect a new
limitation period); Bergman v. Turpin, 206 Va. 539, 145 S.E.2d 135 (1965)(would allow
suits to be postponed indefinitely and prevent defendant's knowing that he is potentially
liable).
34. 283 S.C. 602, 325 S.E.2d 328 (1985).
35. Section 29-5-10 states in pertinent part:
Any person to whom a debt is due for labor performed or furnished ...
shall have a lien upon such building or structure ... to secure the payment of
the debt so due to him, and the costs which may arise in enforcing such lien
under this chapter, including a reasonable attorney's fee ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-10 (1976 & Supp. 1985).
36. Section 29-5-20 provides:
Every laborer, mechanic, subcontractor or person furnishing material for
the improvement of real estate when such improvement has been authorized
by the owner shall have a lien thereon, subject to existing liens of which he has
actual or constructive notice, to the value of the labor or material so furnished,
including the cost of the action and a reasonable attorney's fee which shall be
determined by the court in which the action is brought ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-20 (1976).
8
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Jr., the property owner, and V.F.Q. Associates, the tenant, al-
leged that the fence was erected without their consent. Respon-
dents moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that
sections 29-5-10 and 29-5-20, which provided for attorney's fees
to a prevailing plaintiff only, violated the equal protection guar-
antees of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions.
The court granted the motion and, on appeal, the supreme court
affirmed the lower court's decision.
The court noted that granting attorney's fees to successful
plaintiffs while denying fees to prevailing defendants in mechan-
ics' lien actions created a classification of otherwise similarly sit-
uated parties to a private contract. The court further stated that
the provisions' validity under the equal protection clause de-
pended upon "whether the legislative classification is rationally
related to the object of the statute."7
The appellant in Southeastern Home Building cited two
state goals to justify the statute's award of attorney's fees to the
prevailing plaintiff. The court rejected appellant's first argu-
ment, that mechanics' lien claims should be given priority be-
cause of work performed and materials furnished, concluding
that awarding attorney's fees only to prevailing claimants had no
reasonable relationship to the goal asserted.38 The court rea-
soned that "authorizing fee awards to prevailing defendants, as
well as plaintiffs, would not chill the laborer's right to seek relief
in court. s3 The appellants also argued that the statutes were
justified since they eased "the burden [placed] on the pocket-
books of laborers and materialmen. '4 0 The court noted that this
goal, although admirable, was insufficient to "justify placing an
unfair burden on landowners and other defendants.
'41
In addition, the appellant contended that a complainant's
role as plaintiff and his corresponding burden of proof war-
37. 283 S.C. at 603, 325 S.E.2d at 329.
38. Id. at 603-04, 325 S.E.2d at 329.
39. Id. at 603, 325 S.E.2d at 329.
40. Id. at 604, 325 S.E.2d at 329.
41. Id. The Supreme Court of Delaware in Gaster v. Coldiron, 297 A.2d 384 (Del.
1972), also rejected this same argument and took judicial notice "that mechanics lien
actions are rarely, if ever, filed by laborers; they are filed by material men [sic], contrac-
tors, or subcontractors." Id. at 386. Therefore, the policy of protecting laborers does not
justify "discriminating between plaintiff and defendant. . . in favor of a contractor, sub-
contractor, or material supplier." Id.
1986]
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ranted the disparate treatment.42 In response to this argument,
the court stated that "[a] party's position as either the plaintiff
or defendant does not alone justify superior treatment.
'43
Therefore, determining that all arguments asserted by the ap-
pellant lacked merit, the supreme court found the attorney's
fees provisions to be unconstitutional denials of equal protection
to defendants.
In rendering its decision, the court in Southeastern Home
Building distinguished those cases which awarded attorney's
fees solely to prevailing plaintiffs when the defendant had acted
in bad faith. The court noted that in those cases, unlike the in-
stant case, there was a strong governmental policy to discourage
bad faith dealings. This policy justified the award of attorney's
fees to a plaintiff and supported the denial of fees to a defend-
ant who had acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The court cited Bradley v. Hullander44 which held that
statutes authorizing the award of attorney's fees to the prevail-
ing plaintiff in a securities fraud action were not in violation of
the South Carolina or United States Constitution. The statute in
Bradley did not violate the equal protection clause because it
bore a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state policy.45 The
Bradley court stated that "[i]f the classification is otherwise rea-
sonable, the mere fact that attorney's fees are allowed to suc-
cessful plaintiffs only, and not to successful defendants, does not
render the statute repugnant to the 'equal protection' clause.
'4
6
Unfortunately, the court in Bradley did not elaborate on what
constitutes legitimate state policies.
The decision in Southeastern Home Building places South
42. 283 S.C. at 604, 325 S.E.2d at 329.
43. Id.
44. 277 S.C. 327, 287 S.E.2d 140 (1982).
45. 277 S.C. at 330, 287 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Missouri, Kan. & Tex. R.R. v. Cade,
233 U.S. 642 (1914)); see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975).
46. 277 S.C. at 330, 287 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting Missouri, Kan. & Tex. R.R., 233 U.S.
at 650).
47. The court in Southeastern Home Building cited Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S.C. 680,
258 S.E.2d 883 (1979), as an example of a case in which the purposes of the statutory
classification did not justify discriminating against one class of litigants. The court in
Ramey struck down the South Carolina Motor Vehicle Guest Statute [S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-1-290 (1976)] as violative of equal protection because the statute required nonpaying
guests to "prove more than simple negligence as a basis for recovery." Id. at 681, 258
S.E.2d at 883.
[Vol. 38
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss1/11
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Carolina with other jurisdictions which have rejected the award
of attorney's fees solely to a prevailing plaintiff, absent a legiti-
mate state policy.48 Statutes awarding attorney's fees to a pre-
vailing party rather than a prevailing plaintiff have withstood
equal protection challenges since they do not create a classifica-
tion based strictly on a party's status as defendant or plaintiff.
It is apparent from Southeastern Home Building that a status-
based classification will be upheld only when a strong govern-
mental policy exists to support the denial of equal protection.
Roxanne Bell Mayer
IV. DEPARTING FROM STANDARD JURY SIZE AND ALLOWING
JURORS TO QUESTION WITNESSES IS WITHIN JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
In DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co."" the ap-
pellants assigned error to the departure from standard jury size
and to the practice of allowing jurors to question witnesses.50
Finding both practices within judicial discretion, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals refused to find prejudice in either assign-
ment of error and affirmed a jury verdict for defendant Good-
year Tire and Rubber Company.
The jury for this products liability action was originally
composed of eight members, none of whom were designated as
alternates.5' One jury member, however, was excused when
counsel disclosed a conflict of interest.5 2 Goodyear's motion for a
48. See Builders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor, 150 Cal. 265, 88 P. 982 (1907); David-
son v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 P. 354 (1900); Gaster v. Coldiron, 297 A.2d 384 (Del.
1972); Crim v. Drake, 86 Fla. 470, 98 So. 349 (1923); Manowsky v. Stephan, 233 IMI. 409,
84 N.E. 365 (1908).
49. 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 514. Appellants also cited a third reversible error: refusal to allow the
publication of interrogatories to and answers from the defendant. Additionally, counsel
argued that they were deprived of a fair trial because the defendant did not produce a
certain document during discovery and because the defendant exceeded the record in its
closing argument. Id.
51. 754 F.2d at 514.
52. On the afternoon of the first day, counsel for Goodyear informed the court that
one juror's husband had been represented by the law firm that represented Goodyear.
The juror was not excused at that time, but on the following day counsel for the appel-
lant revealed that the juror was represented presently by a member of counsel's firm.
Record at 91-97.
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mistrial based on the number of jurors was denied, and the trial
continued with a seven-member jury. All seven jurors deliber-
ated and reached a verdict for Goodyear. 5 Appellant claimed
that the departure from the standard jury size of six or twelve
members without written consent was error per se.54
A departure from the authorized jury sizes is permitted only
by "written stipulation or one clearly recorded." 5  In
DeBenedetto, although there was no written stipulation, the
court of appeals found there had been a "clearly recorded"
agreement on the jury size.56 When the intended procedure was
explained to the appellants, they made no objection. Further-
more, at no other time did counsel for the appellants question
the jury composition. The Fourth Circuit found that this silence
constituted the "clearly recorded" agreement.
57
In reaching its decision, the DeBenedetto court relied upon
the policy behind the "clearly recorded" agreement requirement:
"If there is to be a departure from established procedures, mis-
understandings by lawyers. . . can be avoided only if the depar-
ture is by a written stipulation or one clearly recorded."58s Noth-
ing in the record indicated that anyone believed that the
seventh juror was an alternate. Counsel made no objection. Fur-
thermore, on appeal counsel did not argue that they misunder-
stood the status of the seventh juror. Therefore, based upon
these facts, silent assent met the "clearly recorded" requirement.
The second assignment of error was based on the trial
court's decision to allow jurors to question witnesses. After coun-
sel examined the witnesses, the jurors were permitted to direct
questions to the trial judge. The judge instructed the witness to
respond only if he decided the question was proper. Counsel was
given the chance to requestion each witness after all questions
from the jury were answered.5 9 The jury asked over ninety-four
53. 754 F.2d at 514.
54. The District of South Carolina has adopted a local rule which states: "In all civil
cases tried in the United States District Courts for the District of South Carolina, the
issues may be submitted to juries of six (6) or twelve (12) jurors, at the discretion of the
trial judge." Id.
55. Kuykendall v. Southern Ry., 652 F.2d 391, 392 (4th Cir. 1981).
56. 754 F.2d at 515.
57. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Kuykendal, 652 F.2d at 392).
59. Id. at 515.
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questions to fourteen different witnesses during the course of a
ten-day trial.60 The court of appeals warned that the "practice of
juror questioning is fraught with dangers which can undermine
the orderly progress of the trial to verdict."6' The court held,
however, that this practice is a matter within the trial court's
discretion and that no party was prejudiced by any questions
asked.
6 2
This holding is in line with a majority of courts that recog-
nize that jury questioning is primarily within the trial judge's
discretion since he has the best opportunity to evaluate the ef-
fects of juror questioning during the course of any trial. Al-
though juror questioning in this case appears to have far ex-
ceeded the norm, 3 this fact may be explained by the highly
technical nature of the evidence. Since DeBenedetto was a prod-
ucts liability action that concerned a tire failure, both parties
had produced expert witnesses who had examined the tire.
Plaintiff's expert asserted that the tire contained a manufactur-
ing defect. Goodyear's expert claimed the tire sustained road im-
pact damage. Asked to determine the cause of the tire failure,
many jurors directed their questions to the experts in an at-
tempt to understand the tire manufacturing process.64
Perhaps in a less complicated trial, the extent of juror ex-
amination allowed in DeBenedetto would amount to abuse of
discretion. 5 Additionally, the court noted that attorneys for the
appellants never objected to the questioning during the course
of the trial. Although the court did not decide the issue on this
ground alone, the language in the opinion indicates that the
court did consider this factor when determining prejudice.e6
60. Brief of Appellant at 22.
61. 754 F.2d at 516.
62. Id. at 517.
63. See United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
826 (1979); United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Talanker
v. United States, 348 U.S. 887 (1954). For a South Carolina Supreme Court case address-
ing this issue, see State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, 297 S.E.2d 794 (1982), cert. denied., 460
U.S. 1045 (1983), which found no reversible error in the practice of juror questioning.
See generally Annotation, Propriety of Jurors Asking Questions in Open Court During
Course of Trial, 31 A.L.R.3D 872 (1970).
64. Jurors asked the parties' expert witnesses approximately 45 questions. Brief of
Appellant at 40.
65. See State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P.2d 102 (1958)(holding that the trial
judge exceeded his discretion by allowing jurors to ask over 50 questions).
66. The court states: "First, as an important point in the ultimate decision on this
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Therefore, when faced with situations where jury size is altered
or where jurors are allowed to question witnesses, practitioners
should be aware that a timely response is crucial in preserving
future objection.
James M. Griffin
V. ACTION FOR PARENTAL REPAYMENT OF PAST SUPPORT
WITHIN CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION
In Lighty v. South Carolina Department of Social Ser-
vices6 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court continued to define
the boundaries between family court and circuit court jurisdic-
tion. Having indicated in Moseley v. Mosierss and South Caro-
lina Department of Social Services v. Fingerlin"9 that family
courts have exclusive jurisdiction in domestic matters, the su-
preme court in Lighty resolved the question of whether an ac-
tion to establish a parent's liability for repayment of past sup-
port furnished to a child was a domestic matter. The court held
that the action was one for debt, sounding in contract, and that
jurisdiction rests with the circuit court.70
The Department of Social Services (DSS) petitioned the
family court for an order requiring the mother of a child to re-
imburse it for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC)71 moneys that DSS had paid to the child's custodial
aunt. As a condition for receiving assistance, the aunt had as-
signed to DSS any rights to past, present, or future support she
might have against the mother.7 2 DSS petitioned in its status of
issue, we note that appellants did not object during the trial either to the policy of al-
lowing questions by jurors or to any specific juror question." 754 F.2d at 515.
67. 285 S.C. 508, 330 S.E.2d 529 (1985).
68. 279 S.C, 348, 306 S.E.2d 624 (1983).
69. 285 S.C. 73, 328 S.E.2d 71 (1985).
70. A similar result was reached in Hackett v. Haynes, 70 A.D.2d 1051, 417 N.Y.S.2d
533 (App. Div. 1979). But see Toy v. Cherico, 367 A.2d 651 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976). The
approach taken by the Toy court is essentially the one taken by the dissenting justice in
Lighty. See infra note 79.
71. AFDC is a program established by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1982), in which the federal and state governments cooperate to pro-
vide assistance to children who are deprived of support of at least one parent and whose
custodian does not have the means to provide sufficient support.
72. Assignment is required as a condition for receiving assistance by 42 U.S.C. §
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assignee, contending that the action was one for child support.73
The mother demurred, arguing that the action was one for debt
over which the family court had no subject matter jurisdiction.
7 4
In overruling the demurrer, the trial court held that jurisdiction
is determined pursuant to the family court's powers over child
support matters.75
The supreme court reversed, finding that the face of the pe-
tition presented no allegations vesting jurisdiction in the family
court.76 Although the action sought recoupment of child support
and child support is a family court matter, the court looked to
the underlying nature of the action to determine jurisdiction.
The majority found that the suit was one for debt arising out of
a contract and stated that it was "not unlike an action against
one spouse for necessaries provided to the other spouse.
'77
Therefore, under the specific facts presented, the case was found
to be outside the jurisdiction of the family court.
The opinion found it "significant" that no request for ongo-
ing support was made by DSS, 8 thereby suggesting one possible
avenue for pleading that might allow a kind of ancillary jurisdic-
tion over collection actions. Moreover, the case contained no al-
legations of a previous family court order granting custody to
the aunt or requiring the mother to provide support.7 9 Such alle-
601(a)(26)(A) (1982) and 45 C.F.R. § 232.11(a)(1) (1984). See, e.g., Warlick v. Public
Welfare Div., 29 Or. App. 21, 562 P.2d 223 (1977).
73. Record at 3.
74. Brief of Appellant at 7-8.
75. Record at 13. The trial court cited S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-810(b)(17) (Supp.
1981) in its order, although the section had been repealed and replaced by S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-420(30) (1976), which states: "The family court shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion . . . (30) To make any order necessary to carry out and enforce the provisions of
this chapter, and to hear and determine any questions of support ... ." The court
found that a "question of support" was involved in the action, not an adjudication of a
debt. Record at 13. The court's citation error did not effect the outcome of the appeal.
76. 285 S.C. at 510, 330 S.E.2d at 531.
77. Id., 330 S.E.2d at 530 (citing Richland Memorial Hosp. v. Burton, 282 S.C. 159,
318 S.E.2d 12 (1984)). In Burton the hospital brought suit to collect charges from the
husband of a deceased patient for services provided to her. The court found that the
common-law necessaries doctrine allowed the action, which was filed in circuit court. The
implication of the quoted statement is that a necessaries action might lie for support
provided to children as well as spouses.
78. 285 S.C. at 510, 330 S.E.2d at 530.
79. Id. Justice Ness dissented on grounds that the action was one which has its roots
in the common-law and statutory duty to support one's child. This duty, existing apart
from a contract for support or a court order, is a domestic obligation. Thus, Justice Ness
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gations might have provided family court jurisdiction.
By petitioning as assignee of the aunt, DSS limited itself to
whatever remedy the aunt may have had against the mother.8 0 If
DSS had petitioned in its own right under the Uniform Recipro-
cal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), sl the jurisdictional
analysis might have been different. The family court has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over URESA actions, 2 including a proceeding
by the state to secure reimbursement for support furnished.8 3
Although URESA was "designed to improve and extend enforce-
ment of [support] obligations against obligors in other states,""
the provisions of the act also apply in actions within the state
when the person owing support and the child to whom it is owed
are in different counties.
8 5
These possibilities suggest that, under certain circum-
stances, DSS may be able to obtain family court jurisdiction
over a collection action such as the one in Lighty. Although
Lighty appears to restrict family court jurisdiction when deter-
mining a parent's liability for past support, the holding is a nar-
row one and its scope should be limited to cases involving simi-
lar pleadings.
Robert H. Putnam, Jr.
found the source of the obligation to be domestic and DSS's reimbursement action to be
within the exclusive province of the family courts. Id. at 511-12, 330 S.E.2d at 531-32
(Ness, J., dissenting).
80. While the record does not show an express contract between the mother and the
aunt, the court suggests that a contract will be implied under the necessaries doctrine.
Id. at 510, 330 S.E.2d at 530. Therefore, even if DSS had petitioned in its own right as a
supplier of necessaries to the child, its remedy would be limited to the implied contract.
81. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-960 to -1170 (1976 & Supp. 1985).
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(1) (1976).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1000 (1976) provides: "If a state, political subdivision, or
an agency thereof furnishes support to an individual obligee it has the same right to
initiate a proceeding under this subarticle as the individual obligee for the purpose of
securing reimbursement for support furnished and of obtaining continuing support."
DSS argued that this section should be construed as implicitly granting jurisdiction to
the family courts to hear the Lighty action on the ground that the section clearly would
give a sister state agency the opportunity to present just such a collection action in this
state's family court. Brief of Appellee at 3. DSS contended that denying the same right
to it would be illogical. The court in State ex rel. Department of Welfare v. Smith, 275
S.E.2d 918 (W. Va. 1981), agreed with this argument.
84. Baugh v. Baugh, 280 S.C. 59, 61, 309 S.E.2d 756, 757 (1983).
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1120 (1976) states: "This subarticle applies if both the
obligee and the obligor are in this State but in different counties."
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